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Abstract
Moral concepts affect crime supply. This idea is modelled assuming that illegal ac-
tivities is habit forming. We introduce habits in a intertemporal general equilibrium
framework to illegal activities and compare its outcomes with a model without habit
formation. The ﬁndings are that habit (i) reduces the crime level; (ii) reduces the
marginal effect of illegal activities return on crime; (iii) reduces the efﬁcacy of punish-
ment.
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Resumo
Aspectos morais afetam a oferta de crime. Essa id´ eia ´ e modelada assumindo que ativi-
dades ilegais s˜ ao formadoras de h´ abitos. N´ os introduzimos tal hip´ otese em um modelo
de equil´ ıbrio geral intertemporal de atividades ilegais, e comparamos os resultados
com o modelo sem formac ¸˜ ao de h´ abito. Os resultados s˜ ao que o h´ abito (i) reduz o
n´ ıvel de crime; (ii) reduz o efeito marginal dos retornos das atividades ilegais sobre o
crime; (iii) reduz a eﬁc´ acia da punic ¸˜ ao.
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1Crime and Punishment with Habit Formation
1 Introduction
In the seminal paper of Becker and Murphy (1988) habit was included in the utility
function to describe consumption behavior of harmful goods, notably drugs. In the
present paper we merge the Becker and Murphy insight about this link between illegal
behavior and habit with the traditional crime and punishment approach due to Becker
(1968) in a general equilibrium framework.
The existence of habit formation due to factors such as social interactions may af-
fect the behavior of agents in crime supply. Factors such as culture or religion provide
social incentives that may induce habits in illegal activities. For example, surveys in
Britain and the United States have indicated that at least a third of the citizens in both
countries believe that religion provides a sociocultural and/or spiritual foundation for
curtailing criminal behavior (Banks, Maloney and Wittrock, 1975; Jensen, 1981). Ellis
and Peterson (1996) ﬁnd that more religious countries have lower crime rates than less
religious countries, at least regarding property crimes, using data from 13 industrial
nations.
On the other hand Gaviria (2000) demonstrates, using a myriad empirical evidence
— both statistical and anecdotal — that the daily contact of youth with criminal adults
and criminal peers results in the erosion of morals and hence in a greater predisposition
toward crime.
The insight that through the process of habit formation, one´s own past decisions
might inﬂuence the utility yielded by current decisions is hardly new; see, for example,
Pareto (1897) and Marshall (1898).
In fact the habit formation hypothesis has been applied in many issues such as
endogenous growth models (Carroll et al, 2000), cyclical consumption (Dockner and
Feichtinger, 1993), aggregate savings (Alessie and Lusardi, 1997), money and growth
(Faria, 2001), environment (Ono, 2002), ﬁscal policy (Burnside et al, 2004) and mon-
etary policy (McCallum and Nelson,1999, Amato and Laubach, 2004), to mention a
few. All these papers introduce habit in consumption. Nonetheless, Faria and Le´ on-
Ledesma (2004) uses habits in number of hours worked to study labor supply. In fact,
it is not only in consumption that habits may occur. Becker and Murphy (1988, p.
695), for example, explain that: “Not only cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and cocaine
are obviously addictive, but many other goods and activities have addictive aspects”.
Inthispaperweassumethatsocialincentivescreateanethicthataffectsthenumber
of hours allocated to criminal activities by a representative agent. This is modelled by
assuming that crime is habit forming. The idea is quite intuitive: past crime forms a
stock of habits that affect agents’ disposition towards present crime.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model, characterizes
equilibrium and shows the main result. Section 3 provides concluding remarks.
22 The Model
While agents are stimulated to engage in criminal activities according to the expected
positive returns, they are also subject to the effects of crime, with loss in income.
According to this idea, we may argue that the total expected income (Y ) of a represen-
tative agent of this economy will be given by (1).






= 0, if o = ¯ o
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Thus, f(k,o) represents the production function, where k is the capital stock and
o the number of hours spent on criminal activity. On the other hand, φ(o, ¯ o) represents
the net income function of the criminal activity, where the agent chooses the number
of hours that will be dedicated to crime, when faced with the average number of hours
of the other agents, ¯ o. This type of function is commonly used in illicit activity models
such as in Ehrlich and Lui (1999) and Teles (2004). Complementarily, π is the proba-
bility of punishment, and P is the payoff of the punishment. In fact, P may represent
the consumption supplied for criminals by the society in prisons, for example. (see
Fender, 1999).
The production function may be represented by,
f (k,o) = Ak
β (1 − o)
1−β (2)
where agents devotes the fraction (1−o) of his non-leisure time to current production,
A is the level of technology, and β is the capital-share.
If we consider that criminal activity (o) directly affects the well-being of an agent,
and if we incorporate this in his utility function, and that the individual cares not only
about consumption (c) and the instantaneous ﬂow of offenses (o), but also takes into
account his past criminal activities, captured by his stock of habits (h), then the in-








where α is a positive parameter that lies in the unitary interval, σ is the coefﬁcient of
relative risk aversion, and γ ∈ [0,1) indexes the importance of habits. If γ = 0, then
habit stock has no relevance, and the utility function reduces to the traditional case.
While if γ = 1, crime relative to habit stock is very important.
3Following Carroll et al. (2000) it is assumed that the stock of habits is a weighted
average of past offenses. The stock of habits evolves according to:
˙ h = v (o − h) (4)
where v is a positive parameter determining the relative weights of offenses at different
times. The smaller is v, the less important is offenses in the recent past.






˙ k = Y − c − P
˙ h = v (o − h)
(5)
By substituting (1) and (3) in (5) and solving the problem, and applying the equi-


























+ λk {(1 − π)fo + fφo} (7)
˙ λk
λk
= ρ − {(1 − π)fk} (8)















where λk and λh are the co-state variables of k and h respectively.
By substituting (6) in (7), and then this result in (9) and considering that in this
model’ssteady-statethepercapitavariablesremainconstant, meaningthattheshadow-
price of capital and habits remains constant, we will have that the following equations
establishes the steady-state condition.







+ (1 − α)[(1 − π)fo + fφo]
(11)
πP + (1 − π)f = c + P (12)
o = h (13)
Using the production function (3) in this system it is possible to study the effects
of habit formation on crime, according to what is listed in propositions 1 to 3.
4Proposition 1 The importance of habit to the agent has a negative impact on his de-
cision in crime practice if φo > 0 and φoo < 0.
Proof: Solving the system (10)-(13), using (3) and applying the implicit function

















Since φo > 0 and φoo < 0 the relation do
dγ is negative.
Proposition 2 The importance of habit to the agent reduces the effect of crime return
on his decision in crime practice.
Proof: The proof follows immediately from equation (14), where the marginal
return of crime (φo) has a negative relationship with |do/dγ|.
Proposition 3 The importance of habit reduces the efﬁcacy of punishment
Proof: Solving the system (10)-(13), using (3) and applying the implicit function




























1−β [φo − (1 − o)φoo]
)
(15)
where the importance of habit (γ) has a negative relationship with |do/dπ|.
Propositions 1 and 2 state that when habit has a strong weight in the utility func-
tion the agent will practice less crime and the returns to crime become less important
in his decision, respectively. These propositions are important because they lay the
foundation to better understanding the lack of rationality which is frequently involved
in criminality even in those cases in which the agent chooses not to engage in illicit
activities, in spite of being more rational to do so.
Proposition 3 shows that an agent that attributes a strong weight to habit forma-
tion in his or her utility function cares less about the chances of being punished. This
proposition corroborates that habit formation reduces the rationality of crime behavior
and punishment loses its efﬁcacy. This result is fundamental in the analysis of poli-
cies aimed at combating crime, since it becomes clear that under certain conditions
investment in punishment may not be the most effective form of deterring crime.
53 Conclusion
The tradition of the models addressing the economics of crime deﬁnes the decision of
an agent participating in an illicit activity as a rational one, since it is an economic
decision in which the beneﬁts and costs of crime are weighted along with the alter-
natives. (Fender, 1999). From this perspective, this study has introduced habit in an
intertemporal general equilibrium framework and demonstrates that habit reduces the
rationality of crime, since both the returns to crime and punishment play a less impor-
tant role in the agent’s decision to engage in crime.
Comparing these results with the traditional result due to Becker and Murphy
(1988), that built a model of drugs consumption with habit formation some consid-
erations may be due. In Becker and Murphy framework, an increase in permanent
punishment implies an increase on price of drugs, and, consequently, a decrease on
its long run demand. Thus, the drugs trafﬁc will fall, as crime related. In our model,
where another type of crime (property crime)is considered, this relationship will not
occur. If the punishment rises, the effects on crime level may not change signiﬁcantly,
as demonstrated in proposition 3.
Considering education programs, Becker and Murphy argues that greater efforts to
educate the population on the harms of the use of drugs may not offset the effects of
the reduction on dugs price on the long run. Contrarily, we demonstrate that education
policies may be important to break increases on long run crime level if it is able to
build an ethics pattern to avoid illegal activities. Summarily what this paper shows
is that different kinds of crime may have opposite forms of combat, and the theoret-
ical dynamic path of crime will change drastically if we consider habit formation in
alternative ways.
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